Russia’s relations with Central Asian states, namely Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have undertaken dramatic changes since the second half of the 2010s. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic proved another...
Russia’s relations with Central Asian states, namely Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have undertaken dramatic changes since the second half of the 2010s. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic proved another dramatic turning point in the Russo-Central Asian relationship. Determined to change the status-quo of the unipolar international system led by the United States, Russia has sought to deepen the cooperation with China. On the other hand, struggling with the medical and economic difficulties posed by the pandemic, the Central Asian states found themselves in the vulnerable position in terms of the lack of legitimacy caused by the transition of power from the founding presidents to the second generation political elites. Despite the huge investment of China and its economic power in the region, Central Asia is poised to face the increasing influence of Russia with the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Furthermore, Central Asia’s deteriorating economy intensifies its reliance on Russia.
Given the aggressive policies by the Putin administration, well exemplified its decision to annex the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine, the existing literature has shown strong tendency to describe the interactions between Russia and Central Asian States from the neorealist perspectives. However, the expansion of Russia’s power and influence cannot be explained solely with the neorealist or neoclassical realist viewpoints. This paper argues that constructivist approaches are necessary to comprehend the changes in Russia’s relations vis-à-vis Central Asian states regarding discussions on incomplete sovereignty, the issue of persisted influence of Russian-centered diplomatic practices, and the notion of Russia’s own value diplomacy.